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CASES NOTED
conveyed a warranty deed to the plaintiff without notification to the mort-
gagee who held a security deed containing a "dragnet" clause on the same
property, and then died insolvent and considerably in debt to the mortgagee
as a result of business transactions between them. Leffler Co. v. Lane is
concerned with an attempt by the plaintiff mortgagee to bring within the
scope of the "dragnet" clause the indebtedness to itself of a partnership of
which the mortgagor subsequently became a member, the indebtedness
having arisen in the course of business between the partnership and the
mortgagee. The third case, McClure v. Smith, did not involve a "dragnet"
clause, but dealt instead with the extension of the security for one loan to
cover another loan by an apparent agreement of the parties. Disregarding
the McClure case, the Hurst and Leffler cases are readily distinguishable
from the instant case by the'fact that the indebtedness in question arose out
of transactions between the parties, and could therefore be assumed to have
been within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the execution
of the mortgage containing the controversial clause. The Hurst case is
further distinguishable by the fact that the mortgagee had no notice of the
subsequent conveyance of the warranty deed. In that case, while recognizing
that substantial authority was opposed to its views,26 the court nevertheless
felt itself bound by the previous Georgia decisions.27 In several other fairly
recent Georgia cases28 not cited in the instant case where "dragnet" clauses
were broadly construed, the additional indebtedness also arose from transac-
tions between the original parties to the mortgage.
It would seem, therefore, that in the instant case the Georgia Supreme
Court has carried the broad construction of "dragnet" clauses rather far in
favor of the mortgagee. It is submitted that a court sitting in equity should
feel less bound by the strict meaning of contractural verbiage than a court
of law and perhaps more influenced by the intention of the parties and the
customs of the business community with regard to similar transactions, in
order to render truly equitable decisions.
CIVIL PROCEDURE - ABATEMENT FOR FAILURE TO
MAKE PROPER SUBSTITUTION
The plaintiff, widow of a naval officer, procured judgment against Rear
Admiral Buck, Paymaster General of the Navy, requiring payment of widow's
gratuity.1 After judgment was entered, W. A. Buck was succeeded in office
26. Hurst v. Flynn-Harris-Bullard Co., supra note 18 at 483, 166 S.E at 505, citing
annotation to Ann. Gas. 1913C 552, 556 to the effect that advances made after notice of
the subsequent liens do not have priority over such liens by the weight of authority.
27. Ibid.
28. Zachry v. Industrial Loan & Investment Co., supra note 18; Bank of Cedartown
v. Holloway-Smith Co., sura note 10; Dudley v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 60 Ga.
App. 240, 2 S.E.2d 907 (1939); Albany Loan & Finance Co. v. 'ift, 43 Ga. App. 789,
160 S.E. 661 (1931).
1. 41 STAT. 812, 824 (1920), as amended 34 U.S.C. § 943 (Supp. 1949).
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by Rear Admiral Edwin 1). Foster and the government appealed. Neither
party sought substitution of the original defendant's successor within the
statutory time limit and the Court of Appeals remanded with orders to dis-
miss the complaint. Held, on certiorari, that failure to scek substitution of
the defendant's successor in office within the statutory period abated the
suit and the plaintiff lost her judgment. Snyder v. Buck, 71 Sup. Ct. 93
(1950).
At common law it was consistently held that an action by or against
an officer in his official capacity abated if the officer died or for any reason
ceased to hold the office.2 His successor in office was not permitted to be
brought into the action by way of amendment to the proceedings or through
an order for substitution.3 An exception, however, was recognized in an
action brought by or against officers in their official capacities as members
of a continuing body.' The injustice of this rule influenced the Supreme
Court, in Bernardin v. Buttervorth,5 to suggest that "Congress should pro-
vide for the difficulty by enacting that, in the case of suits against the heads
of departments abating by death and resignation, it should be lawful for
the successor in office to be brought into the case on petition, or some other
appropriate method."6 In 1899, Congress provided for such continuance
upon proper showing that a settlement of the questions involved could not
otherwise be obtained.7 This Act, however, had no application to other than
federal officers and the common law rule was still applied by the federal
courts in cases involving state or municipal officials.8 These officials, how-
ever, were also brought under the new rule by the Act of 1925 by which
Congress, again at the instance of the Supreme Court,9 extended the 1899
Act to make it cover them and also to reduce the period of time during
which substitution could be made.'0 This Act was repealed by Congress in
1948 and the matter is now encompassed in Federal Rules of Civil Proced-
ure" which provide a means of substitution foi an officer of any political
subdivision. This new rule, however, fails to state which party shall be
burdened with the duty to make proper substitution and few courts have
2. Bernardin v. Butterworth, 169 U.S. 600 (1898) (death); Warner Valley Stock
Co. v. Smith, 165 U.S. 28 (1896) (resignation); Long v. Lochren, 164 U.S. 701 (1896);
United States ex rel. Warden v. Chandler, 122 U.S. 643 (1887); United States v. Bout-
well, 17 Vall. 604 (U.S. 1873) (retirement): Secretary v. McGarrahan, 9 Wall. 298
(U.S. 1869) (resignation).
4. Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250 (1913); Murphy v. Utter, 186 U.S. 95 (1901):
Thompson v. United States, 103 U.S. 480 (1881): Comm'rs v. Sellew, 99 U.S. 624
(1878); see Irwin v. Wright, 258 U.S. 219, 224 (1921).
5. 169 U.S. 600 (1898).
6. Id. at 605.
7. 30 STAT. 822 (1899).
8. Irwin v. Wright, supra note 4; Shaffer v. Howard, 249 U.S. 200 (1918); Pullman
Co. v. Knott, 243 U.S. 447 (1916); Pullman Co. v. Croom, 231 U.S. 571 (1913);
Richardson v. Mchesney, 218 U.S. 487 (1910); Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590 (1903).
9. Irwin v. Wright, supra note 4, at 223.
10. 43 STAT. 936-941 (1925), 28 U.S.C. § 780 (1946).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
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ruled on this question. 12  Since these statutes abrogate the common law,
strict compliance is required, and if proper substitution is not made the
action will abate.'3 This, however, does not mean the cause of action will
die.' 4 In many recent suits against federal officers, the courts, in an effort
to allow the substance of the action to prevail over procedure, have recog-
nized the United States as the real party in interest, the officer in whose
name the suit is instigated being a mere nominal party. 5
The instant case was governed by the 1925 Act.'6 The court held that
since the complaint alleged no claim against the defcndant personally and
since proper substitution was not obtained within the statutory period, the
suit abated and the plaintiff lost her judgment. One dissent classified this
as a representative action"7 claiming the government attorney in bringing
the appeal in the defendant's name merely recognized him as an alias for
the United States. This dissent reasoned that since the plaintiff could have
brought her claim directly against the government,18 the judgment of the
District Court should, in effect, be a money judgment against the United
States. It argued, further, that the court could, as a matter of record, note
that the Paymaster General of the Navy is now someone else and allow the
appeal to proceed on that basis. Another dissent asserted that the court's
decision placed upon the appellee the burden of correcting his adversary's
error "' and that the appeal itself should have been dismissed on the court's
own motion.
The law on substitution in its present form 20 is openly recognized as
12. Bowles v. Ohlhausen, 71 F. Supp. 199 (N.D. 111. 1947) (in suits against a
government officer, the plaintiff is required to move to substitute); cf. Bowles v. Veiner,
6 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. Mich. 1947) (the rule does not refer to the successor but to the
opposite party).
13. Mathues v. United States, 282 U.S. 802 (1930); Clausen v. Curran, 276 U.S.
590 (1927); Lecrone v. McAdoo, 253 U.S. 217 (1920); McVey v. Magnolia Petroleum
Co., 114 F.2d Il (10th Cir. 1940); Bowles v. Ohlhausen, supra note 12; Bowles v.
Siegel, 7 F.R.D. 331 (D.D.C. 1947); Bowles v. Weiner, supra note 12; of. ex parte La
Prade, 289 U.S. 444 (1932); Davis v. Preston, 280 U.S. 406 (1930).
14. See Defense Supplies Corp. v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 336 U.S. 631, 637
(1948); Fix v. Philadelphia Barge Co., 290 U.S. 530, 533 (1933).
15. Fleming v. Goodwin, 165 F.2d 334 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 334 U.S. 828
(1948); Seven Oaks v. Federal Hoosing Adm'n, 171 F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1948); Ralph
D'Oenel Co. v. Woods, 171 F.2d 112 (8th Cir. 1948); Northwestern Lumber & Shingle
Co. v. United States, 170 F.2d 692 (10th Cir. 1948); United States v. Koike, 164 F.2d
155 (9th Cir. 1947); United States v. Figur, 80 F. Supp. 140 (D. Minn. 1948); Fleming
v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 8 F.R.D. 42 (W.D. Pa. 1948); United States v. Saunders
Petroleum Co., 7 F.R.D. 608 (W.D. Mo. 1947); Porter v. Pure Oil Co., 7 F.R.D. 577
(E.D. Pa. 1947); of. Porter v. Maule, 160 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1947); Bowles v. Ell-Car
Co., 71 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
16. Supra note 1 0(repealed by 62 S'rAT. 992 (1948) but any rights or liabilities
accrued under the act are reserved).
17. Snyder v. Buck, 71 Sup. Ct. 93, (1950) (Dissenting opinion at 100).
18. 12 STAT. 765 (1863), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 456, 792, 794, 2503 (Supp.
1950) (plaintiff could have brought her action in the Court of Claims); 24 STAT. 505
(1887), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1492, 2509 (Stipp. 1950) (plaintiff could have
brought her action in the District Court).
19. Snyder v. Buck, supra note 17, at 102.
20. See note 11 supra.
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poor law.2' It is submitted that in the present case the court's holding
merely perpetuated formality of procedural requirements in failing to look
behind the nominal defendant to the real party in interest. In such cases,
in the absence of amendments to the rules, the court should, as the dissent
22
suggests and as many federal courts have done,23 recognize the United States
as the real party in interest and not allow the action to abate for failure of
proper substitution. In any event, effort should be made to alleviate a situ-
ation in which a party to an action must correct his adversary's error.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-DOMESTIC RELATIONS-COLLATERAL
ATTACK ON DIVORCE DECREE BY STRANGER TO ACTION
After the death of IV-, H married \V-,, and they established their
residence in New York. In August 1941, V-, obtained a divorce from H in
a Florida proceeding,' although the undisputed facts show that she did not
comply with the jurisdictional 90-day residence requirement.2 In 1944, H
married W-,, and in 1945 H died, leaving a will in which he gave his entire
estate to his daughter by W-,. After probate of the will, V-, filed notice
of her election to take the statutory one-third share of the estate." This
election was contested by H's legatee, the daughter by W-,, who argued
that \V-,'s Florida divorce from H was invalid and therefore W-, could
claim no status as H's surviving spouse. The New York Surrogate 4 ruled in
favor of W-,, and that ruling was unanimously upheld by the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court. The New York Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the Florida judgment finding jurisdiction to decree
the divorce bound only the parties themselves and, as the court construed
the Florida cases to allow the daughter to attack the decree collaterally in
Florida, it decided she should be equally free to do so in New York. On
certiorari, held, Florida divorce against husband rendered after his general
appearance and contest on merits is not subject to collateral attack on juris-
dictional grounds by his daughter in Florida, and is not subject to collateral
21. 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 510 (The author says the rule for substitution
is needless formality and substitution should be put on a flexible basis. The rule is a
substantial restatement of a statute that was only partially sound in its approach to the
problem.).
22. See note 17 supra.
23. See note 15 supra.
I. In this proceeding, H had appeared by attorney and interposed an answer denying
the wrongful acts but not questioning the allegations as to residence in Florida.
2. FLA. STAT. § 65.02 (1949). (Thfis has been construed to require residence for
the 90 days immediately preceding the filing date,); Curley v. Curley, 144 Fla. 728, 198
So. 584 (1940). In the instant ease \\-, arrived in Florida from New York in June, and
filed a bill of complaint on July 29.
3. Pursuant to N.Y. DECHDFNT ESTATE LAw § 18.
4. Who heard the cause under the provisions of N.Y. SURROGATE'S COURT ACT
§ 145-a.
5. In re Johnson's Estate, 301 N.Y. 13, 92 N.E.2d 44 (1950).
